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When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was created, its
purpose was to support the new system of fixed exchange rate
regimes. With the breakdown of the par-value system, its article on
exchange-rate arrangements—Article IV—had to be revised. Per the
revised version, the IMF would annually write reports on countries’
economic situation and provide policy recommendations.
This shift on the IMF’s role, along with the attachment of
conditionalities on lending facilities, considerably increased
the institution’s influence on countries’ policies. IMF policy
recommendations in Article IV reports were criticised for being
orthodox and restrictive, especially for developing countries.
Recently, the Fund has published papers and organized
conferences that showed some rethinking toward some policies in
the institution, especially related to instruments to fight inflation,
the role of capital controls, the use of automatic stabilizers and
the importance of social stability to growth (see Ostry et al., 2010;
Blanchard et al., 2010). The paper on which this One Pager is
based (Roy and Ramos, 2011) looks at whether this Headquarters
receptiveness has been translated into the Fund’s Article IV-based
policy analysis and recommendations.
The paper shows that exchange rate assessments, in most cases,
relied entirely on econometric exercises that depend on highly
uncertain variables. Moreover, some exercises assumed that
countries had implemented the policies that the IMF had
recommended to them. Many reports downplayed the exchange
rate misalignment issue, a consequence of two common analytical
practices. First, the reports consider only the averages of the
different misalignment estimations—although these often diverged
significantly. Second, the reports highlighted the uncertainties
inherent in these exercises when they indicated misalignment,
concluding that there was no misalignment. Thus, in the case of
Guinea-Bissau, it was concluded that estimations “do not suggest
that the exchange rate is overvalued” (IMF, 2010c), although
estimations indicated overvaluation of 3 per cent to 21 per cent.
In the case of Cameroon, the conclusion was that the moderated
appreciation “could be corrected if the euro current weakness is
sustained” and the focus of policies were on enhancing the
“business environment” (IMF, 2010a).
There continues to be a preference for floating exchange
rates, with many reports recommending higher exchange rate
variability despite recognizing the adverse effects on inflation
rates. For example, Paraguay seeks to temper inflation by limiting
exchange rate variability, due to its significant exchange rate
pass-though effect on inflation and to the limited effectiveness
of its monetary policies. Nevertheless, IMF advice was to avoid
exchange rate interventions.
The IMF’s recent position on the use of capital controls
was not reflected in any report. In the case of South Africa,
these were said to be ineffective. For India, it was advised
that they should be the last resort only.
Regarding fiscal policies, analyses continue to be short-term.
In many cases, the IMF recommended tighter policies to countries
that were either struggling to recover from the 2008/09 crisis or had
weak economic prospects. Fiscal consolidation was even advised in
cases where the reports showed that there was no problem of debt
solvency. No options were typically offered. Thus, Botswana, which
has serious unemployment and HIV/AIDS-related issues, was advised
to implement fiscal consolidation, although it has a stabilization
fund of about 54 per cent of GDP.
The reports also tended to put low emphasis on domestic resource
mobilization and even recommended that some countries opt for
external debt due to its lower cost after the crisis. This advice was
given even to countries where domestic funding was available
and not expensive, such as Egypt. In Colombia’s case, international
credibility was seen as the driver for fiscal consolidation as it
“would likely improve the prospects for an upgrade from
credit rating agencies” (IMF, 2010b).
The inflation analyses were rather superficial, with the exception
of the analyses for China and India. There was no discussion of the
costs of inflation and the costs of the policies proposed to fight it.
Recommendations mostly focused on monetary tightening,
although inflation was often attributed to supply factors, such
as food prices, exchange rate movements or increases in taxes.
In the case of Jordan, the report states that “inflation is projected
to increase in line with imported commodity (energy and food)
prices” and advises the Central Bank to “tighten monetary conditions
if inflation accelerates” (IMF, 2010d). A similar recommendation was
made for Indonesia, which, apart from having supply-side inflation,
has been challenged by excessive capital inflows—two reasons
why a monetary tightening would not be appropriate.
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